Successfully helping southern Sudan recover from decades of war depends on the existence of efficient funding mechanisms that can translate into concrete social services and economic opportunities for the Sudanese people. Ultimately, a significant increase in donor funding is necessary to fill the recovery gap. The Government of Southern Sudan should prepare a recovery strategy and allocate funds for its implementation, while international donors should identify an appropriate recovery funding mechanism and fund it without decreasing current emergency and development allocations.

• The new pooled fund recovery mechanism must be:
  • Multi-year to enable planning of longer-term activities and building of partnerships with state and local governments and local civil society;
  • Directly-accessible to international and national NGOs without the requirement that they apply through a UN agency;
    
  • Appropriate to local conditions and seasonal factors, considering the limitations posed by the rainy season to the work schedule;
  • Administered by an agency which has demonstrated sufficient managerial capacity and which does not take personnel away from the management of already existing funds;
  • Transparent in its management, with public financial breakdowns of overhead costs, an oversight committee that includes local/state governments and NGOs, and regular monitoring and evaluation of its impact;
  • Capable of building capacity of local and state governments and local NGOs;
  • Focused on the expansion of basic services, maintenance of the existing services and creation of livelihood opportunities in both urban and rural areas.
• The principal existing pooled funding mechanisms are not appropriate for recovery funding. While the Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF) has a one year funding limit and is focused on emergency needs, the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) only provides long-term development funding. To date, the MDTF is more successful in addressing macro-infrastructures and building capacity of central government than in service delivery.


• Some smaller pooled funding mechanisms have provided limited resources for recovery with some success, such as the Basic Services Fund (BSF) and the Recovery and Rehabilitation Program (RRP). These funds were set up to cover the recovery gap between the CHF and the MDTF at a time when it was anticipated that the MDTF would soon be able to provide the necessary recovery funding. It is now clear that the MDTF will not be able to provide speedy recovery funding.


• Bilateral funding remains critical. The Joint Donor Team South Sudan – whose aim is to better coordinate and harmonize donors’ interventions and partnership with the GoSS and the MDTF – also focuses its work on supporting provision of basic social services through complementary contributions with bilateral funding.


• The money currently available for recovery funding is totally inadequate in relation to the needs. For example, the BSF has provided £20 million. The RRP has provided €54 million, with a further €50 million committed for a second phase from 2009. In southern Sudan costs are much higher than in other post-conflict country contexts due to the huge geographical distances and the lack of existing infrastructure. For example, in Northern Bahr El Ghazal the cost of one borehole is US$15-16,000 (five times the average cost in Afghanistan) and the cost of building four schools is US$770,000 (three times the average cost in Afghanistan).


• A pooled recovery funding mechanism, either new or expansion of an existing one, will only be successful if it is capable of garnering the approval of major donor governments. Such a mechanism must be urgently identified. It should not divert money that was or would otherwise be provided to the CHF, MDTF or on a bilateral basis.