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From inception in 2004 to April 2008, State-funded ACOTA contractors trained a total of 36,968 African peacekeepers. The number looks impressive at first blush, but a recent GAO report found that the DOS lacks the capacity to assess the quality and effectiveness of ACOTA. The GAO found that the provision of equipment to countries deployed to peacekeeping missions has also gone wrong. As of April 2008, $9 million of equipment obligated since 2005 for countries deployed to missions in Somalia and Sudan had not been provided by State – while $5.6 million in fiscal year 2006 funds obligated for the purchase of equipment to support peacekeepers deployed from Rwanda, Ghana, Burundi, and Nigeria had not yet been expended.
In a weak attempt at building sustainable African peacekeeping capacity, the DOS has spent some $12 million on activities aimed at enhancing the ability of countries to conduct their own peacekeeping training and to plan and manage their own operations. Part of this money has gone towards training 2,384 military peacekeeping instructors in African countries, but State could not identify whether these instructors subsequently conduct training. It is unlikely that they have; all the African armies and regional organizations I have worked over the past fifteen years lack the training infrastructure and finances to plan and conduct dedicated peacekeeping training without external assistance.
To its credit, the DOS has assigned staff within the Bureau of African Affairs to monitor contractor performance, and it established a program management team to oversee the activities of contractors providing training in Africa. However, the GAO reported that the team is comprised of nine contractor employees and only one federal employee. It is thus largely a case of contractors overseeing contractors, with the cash-work nexus no doubt trumping professional desire to seek durable solutions to Africa’s enduring capacity problems.
THE "INTERAGENCY" ISSUE
AFRICOM brings to the fore many aspects of the broader challenge faced by a US administration that is intent on pursuing a “whole of government” approach to implementing its “transformational diplomacy” agenda. According to the dominant discourse on this subject, the challenge of engaging constructively with the world – particularly where this involves liberating oppressed peoples and building them a democracy – can best be met by increasing the levels of cooperation between and among the military and other government agencies to the extent that they are acting in harmony with a singular sense of purpose. It is this discourse that has elevated the word "interagency" from its status as an adverb or adjective (as in interagency cooperation or interagency input) to a noun – as in the INTERAGENCY.
Few would argue against the need for enhanced communication and cooperation among government agencies and between them and the military, or against a joined-up approach to a foreign policy objective of building the foundations of good governance in foreign countries. However, the DOD is so strong in human and material resources, and in thinking power as well as firepower, that its civilian agency counterparts pale into insignificance. There can thus be no meaningful talk of partnerships or an interagency team. The “interagency” in the context of US AFRICOM is in fact the Department of Defense, a department that includes many of the brightest and the best civilians in the federal government and that is adept at paying lip service to the myth of real interagency participation in planning, decision making and policy implementation.
Ms. Whelan emphasized in her testimony the fact that AFRICOM’s Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) is a Senior Foreign Service officer from the DOS, and that this civilian deputy (Ambassador Mary Yates) is responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of AFRICOM’s security assistance work. However, the testimony did not reveal that the DCMA’s salary is paid by the DOD, not the DOS – and it is a truism that s/he who pays the piper calls the tune.
Ms. Whelan further assured this Subcommittee that: "USAFRICOM will include a significant and carefully selected number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development" and that … "[t]he response and support from the interagency, both in collaboration and participation, has been outstanding." In their joint statement, Ambassador Yates and General Snodgrass echoed the sentiment that "the level of participation in USAFRICOM from across the USG has been excellent." Yet Mr. John Pendleton of the GAO testified that DOD has had difficulties integrating interagency personnel in the command, and that DOD continues to lower its estimate of the ultimate level of interagency participation in AFRICOM. The reason, of course, is that the human resources of DOS and AID have been systematically degraded to the point where there are simply not enough federally-employed foreign service and development professionals to go around. Thus, while DOD is making substantive progress in filling its 1,304 approved positions for AFRICOM headquarters, the current plan is to have only13 positions filled by representatives from non-DOD organizations. This represents a DOD to "interagency" ratio of 100:1 and indicates that the kind of interagency team originally envisaged remains notional at best. Moreover, AFRICOM’s continued emphasis on the civilian and diplomatic nature of Ambassador Mary Yates’ role is perplexing. Like her small number of non-DOD colleagues in AFRICOM, Ms. Yates is embedded in a military structure and seems to see any interagency coordination on policy and program implementation taking place outside of the Command. Indeed, in their joint testimony Amb. Yates and Gen. Snodgrass describe AFRICOM as the "military component within the context of the broader USG effort" and state that AFRICOM will conduct all its activities as "part of the interagency team." On the other hand, their testimony states elsewhere that "our capacities as an interagency command are growing" and that "we anticipate the USAFRICOM interagency team will further foster closer collaboration within the USG."
Such apparent confusion is not surprising; the "interagency," like AFRICOM, remains largely a mythical construct and will do so for as long as the structural imbalances exist – imbalances in civilian and military power distribution, between Defense, Diplomacy and Development as instruments of US foreign policy, and between the amount of common goods and services provided by commercial contractors versus those provided by public servants in federal jobs.
While the sentiments I have expressed today may seem overwhelmingly negative, I do believe that Africa needs AFRICOM. Not the mythical AFRICOM that has emerged to date, but a unified geographic command that can make a clear and credible commitment to providing long-term, sustainable support to African partner countries’ and organizations’ quest to develop a real capacity for effective conflict management. Africa needs an AFRICOM that can work with partner agencies and countries to strengthen those African institutions that should provide stability and security under the rule of law. It needs an AFRICOM that has the knowledge and expertise to critically examine programs such as AFRICAP and ACOTA; that can properly evaluate and upgrade these and other programs to ensure their relevance, coherence and effectiveness in building sustainable African security capabilities Currently, however, neither State nor DOD have a firm handle on "capacity-building," probably because this is essentially a developmental concept – and USAID’s small voice has been largely silent on the issue of AFRICOM. Capacity building is a long-term, relationship-based activity, rather than simply a menu of trainings or skill-sets to be delivered in Africa by a variety of commercial contractors that have no diplomatic relationships whatsoever with the host nations concerned. Human resources development is central to any capacity building process. Foreign-led practices have to be replaced by local training, education and transfer of technical know-how, for the aim of capacity building is to nurture local ownership and to develop local competencies in order to break out of a vicious circle of dependency. The design and implementation of such programs requires substantial diplomatic skill and developmental expertise. AFRICOM presently lacks the human resources to do these things – it lacks an appropriately balanced staff of serving professionals with the knowledge and ability to work in and with Africa. This is a weakness in AFRICOM that cannot be addressed without a fundamental strengthening of departmental capacity at the center. The weakness will not be overcome by a continued fixation with "the interagency," while the real need is for strengthening the human and financial resources of "the agency" – the US Agency for International Development, in particular – but also the DOS and its Africa Bureau.
Refugees International and many like-minded organizations are therefore calling upon the next President to work closely with Congress to ensure that the further development of AFRICOM is accompanied by a significant strengthening of State’s Africa Bureau, and of USAID personnel dedicated to Africa. In the interim, there is a clear need for continued close oversight of AFRICOM plans and activities by this Subcommittee and others in Congress, to ensure that the Command does not treat its responsibilities in Africa as just another Federal Business Opportunity.